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WHEN IS A PRINCIPAL CHARGED
WITH AN AGENT’S KNOWLEDGE?
DEBORAH A. DEMOTT*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Within the common law of agency, rules of imputation govern
when a principal is deemed to know facts that are known by an agent.
The common law defines agency as a consensual and fiduciary rela-
tionship in which one person’s actions have power to affect the legal
relations of another person; an agent acts on behalf of a principal and
is subject to the principal’s control.1 Imputation comes into play in de-
termining a principal’s legal rights and obligations as between the
principal and third parties with whom the agent deals on the princi-
pal’s behalf, when knowing a fact is relevant to legal relations. Impu-
tation has been characterized as a disorderly doctrine that is difficult
to rationalize and to justify or explain in any satisfying or comprehen-
sive way.2  The doctrine presents challenges because it applies broadly
and to widely ranging circumstances. Imputation also requires a coun-
ter-intuitive willingness to assume that one person’s knowledge, with-
out more, is known by another person. These difficulties are worth
confronting, though, because imputation is central to the bases on
which agency ascribes responsibility for one person’s actions to an-
other person and thus to agency doctrine as a whole.
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1. Formally defined, “[a]gency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a
‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the princi-
pal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise
consents so to act.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001).
2. See F.M.B. REYNOLDS, BOWSTEAD AND REYNOLDS ON AGENCY 441 (17th ed. 2001).
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This essay begins by exploring the basics of how imputation doc-
trine operates, including the circumstances under which an agent is
treated as knowing a fact. Although the primary focus is on cases
from the United States, contrasting English cases are discussed at
points. The essay next evaluates competing justifications for imputa-
tion. It argues that the traditional justifications for imputation, though
helpful, are incomplete and ultimately unsatisfactory because they fail
to account for well-settled aspects of imputation doctrine and its con-
sequences. The essay then advances alternate justifications that
achieve a closer correspondence between imputation and other
agency doctrines. In particular, imputation recognizes that the rela-
tionship between principal and agent may create incentives for an
agent to be reticent in transmitting information to the principal when
the agent believes the principal may prefer not to know the informa-
tion.
Imputation may seem a counterintuitive or primitive legal doc-
trine or practice. It’s natural to think that what one person knows be-
comes known by others only as a result of some intermediate process
of communication or learning. Likewise, we don’t assume that what
one person knows, another person also knows simply because of the
relationship between them. We naturally assume that the contents of
a person’s mind are just that—tied to or embedded in that person’s
conscious and unconscious mental states and not automatically within
the mind of another person. Thus, imputation may seem to require
some suspension of ordinary assumptions about how human cognition
in fact works.
Imputing one person’s knowledge to another could be charac-
terized as a quintessential legal fiction. It is a representative instance
in which the law for some reason deems something to be true that is
not in another respect.3 Moreover, basic aspects of the common law of
agency could be characterized as fiction piled upon fiction. For exam-
ple, like much else in the law, agency includes within its cast of char-
acters actors who are not natural persons, such as nation-states and
corporations. Treating nations and corporations as legally consequen-
tial persons necessitates doctrines—like imputation and other agency-
law doctrines—that explain how such persons may take action in the
3. On legal fictions generally, see LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967); Note, Les-
sons from Abroad: Mathematical, Poetic, and Literary Fictions in the Law, 115 HARV. L. REV.
2228 (2002).
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physical world with legal consequences.4 Thus, one fiction—corporate
personality—may necessitate another fiction—imputation.
As it happens, many legal fictions are unproblematic because
they are not deceptive. This is because some consequences of legal
doctrine, like corporate personality, may have originated as fictions
but now fool no one because their operation is so widely known.5 Im-
putation, likewise, is not likely to fool people into thinking that a
principal in fact knows what an agent knows because the doctrine is
so well-established that people recognize it for what it is, a mecha-
nism with which the law ascribes responsibility.
II.  TWO BASIC ILLUSTRATIONS
As a general matter, imputation charges a principal with the legal
consequences of knowledge of a fact known by an agent when knowl-
edge of the fact is material to the agent’s duties to the principal and to
the principal’s legal relations with third parties.6 The doctrine is appli-
cable in a diverse range of circumstances, given the variety of situa-
tions in which knowledge of a fact is relevant to a person’s legal rights
and duties. For example, knowing a fact may make an actor’s conduct
4. Ascribing legal personality to corporations and other legal entities is problematic if an
individual human being is treated as the paradigmatic legal subject, as opposed to one instance
of a legal subject. See Nicola Lacey, ‘Philosophical Foundations of the Common Law’: Social not
Metaphysical, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 17, 25 (4th ser., Jeremy Horder ed.,
2000). Professor Lacey suggests recognizing that, whether a person is an individual or a corpora-
tion, “legal personality is not straightforwardly descriptive: rather, it makes reference to the
conditions under which it is true to say that some social phenomenon—human, corporate, or
other—may be held liable in law.” Id. at 26. Consistent with this insight, not all human beings
have capacity to do all legally consequential acts. For example, minors lack capacity in many
instances to enter into binding contracts. Within agency, capacity to do an act through an agent
is a function of the principal’s capacity. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.04(1)
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001) (stating that an agent may act when the principal “would have ca-
pacity if acting in person at the time the agent takes action”). A person’s power to act as an
agent may exceed the person’s capacity to be bound as a principal. See id. § 3.05 cmt. b (“The
capacity to do a legally consequential act by means of an agent is coextensive with the princi-
pal’s capacity to do the act in person.”).
5. See Fuller supra note 3, at 19:
Probably the maxim “qui facit per alium, facit per se” was originally a fiction because it
was understood as an invitation to the reader to pretend that the act in question had
actually been done by the principal in person. But the statement has been so often re-
peated that it now conveys its meaning (that the principal is legally bound by the acts
of the agent) directly; the pretense that formerly intervened between the statement and
this meaning has been dropped out as a superfluous and wasteful intellectual opera-
tion. The death of a fiction may indeed be characterized as a result of the operation of
the law of economy in the field of mental processes.
(emphasis added).
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002) (imput-
ing to the principal material facts “an agent knows or has reason to know”).
10DEDEMOTT 09/10/03  4:14 PM
294 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 13:291
tortious or may establish a defense to liability. A person may own
property subject to another person’s interest in the property if the
owner acquires the property with knowledge of the other person’s in-
terest. Moreover, having knowledge of a fact may determine whether
a person has asserted legal rights in a timely fashion.
Before examining exceptions and variations, it is helpful to see
how the basic principle of imputation applies to two concrete and
typical sets of facts. First, suppose Isabella, an art collector, wishes to
acquire property on which to build a museum to house her collection.
She retains Bernard as her agent for this purpose. Bernard locates a
suitable property and negotiates a purchase price and other terms
with Henry, the owner of the property. Prior to closing, Bernard
learns that the property is subject to an unrecorded lien in favor of
Maisie. Bernard does not tell Isabella about Maisie’s lien and pur-
chases the property for Isabella. If Isabella herself knew about Mai-
sie’s lien, she would hold the property subject to it. If Bernard’s
knowledge of the lien is imputed to Isabella, she holds the property
subject to Maisie’s lien as if she had actual personal knowledge of it.7
Notice the practical consequences of imputing Bernard’s knowl-
edge to Isabella. Imputation determines the parties against whom a
third party may assert claims, as well as the remedies available. Impu-
tation gives Maisie a claim against property that Isabella owns as a
consequence of her transaction with Henry. Unless Bernard’s knowl-
edge is imputed to Isabella, Maisie is left without a claim against the
property; indeed, unless Isabella is charged with Bernard’s knowl-
edge, Maisie may be left with no remedy at all. Maisie was not a party
to the transaction between Isabella and Henry, and she has no rela-
tionship with Bernard on the basis of which she might establish that
Bernard owed her a duty to protect her interests. Leaving Maisie in a
remediless predicament could be justified, of course, on the basis that
her lien was unrecorded. Relying on that justification to leave Maisie
without a remedy would leave the nagging question why Isabella
would acquire the property subject to Maisie’s lien if she had personal
knowledge of it. If the fact that the lien is unrecorded does not vitiate
7. For a recent example, see Gregg v. Cloney (In re Marriage of James & Dana Cloney),
110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 615, 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that an agent’s knowledge of specific
information material to his duties “that could have a substantial adverse effect on the principal”
will be imputed to the principal; thus, the court imputed the agent’s knowledge of a vendor’s use
of alternate names to the purchaser of a property). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 274 (1958) (“The knowledge of an agent who acquires property for his principal af-
fects the interests of his principal . . . to the same extent as if the principal had acquired it with
the same knowledge.”).
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its effect if Isabella personally knows about it, it’s hard to see why the
same fact is relevant if only Bernard knows about Maisie’s lien.
Second, and redeploying some of the same parties, suppose
Isabella retains Bernard as her agent to deal in paintings. Bernard
sells a painting owned by Isabella to Junius, representing that it is a
Vermeer. Bernard knows that this statement is not true because he
knows that the painting is a skillfully-executed nineteenth-century
forgery. Bernard does not share this information with Isabella or with
Junius, both of whom believe the painting to be a Vermeer. If Ber-
nard has defrauded Junius, it is because he has made a false statement
of a material fact, knowing it to be false, and Junius has acted rea-
sonably in relying on it. If Bernard’s knowledge of the falsity of his
statement is imputed to Isabella, she, like Bernard, is subject to li-
ability to Junius for fraud.8
In this illustration as in the first, imputation is relevant to deter-
mining the parties against whom a third party may have claims and
the remedies that may be available. The actor’s state of mind is an
element of the tort of fraud; imputing Bernard’s knowledge of the fal-
sity of his statement to Isabella underlies Isabella’s vicarious liability
for Bernard’s tortious misstatement to Junius. However, in contrast
to the first illustration, Junius is not without a remedy if Bernard’s
knowledge is not imputed to Isabella because Junius may sue Bernard
for damages. Imputing Bernard’s knowledge to Isabella adds Isabella
as a prospective—and possibly more solvent—defendant. Moreover,
against Isabella, Junius may seek rescission of the transaction by of-
fering to return the painting in exchange for the purchase price. Re-
scission would not be available against Bernard because, acting only
as Isabella’s agent, he was not a party to the transaction and does not
possess the sale proceeds.9 Alternatively, suppose Bernard did not
8. See, e.g., Dyke v. Peck, 719 N.Y.S.2d 391, 394 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (imputing to a
seller a material misrepresentation made by his agent to a buyer of real estate and holding that
the buyer’s reliance was not reasonable under the circumstances).
9. This point has ramifications that are beyond the scope of this essay. Consider the struc-
ture of agency relationships in typical sales transactions in residential real estate. If a property-
owner consents, the agent with whom the property is listed may offer other real-estate brokers a
share of any sales commission if a prospect to whom they show the property purchases it. The
common-law rule in most states characterizes a “showing broker” as the seller’s subagent, that
is, an agent to whom the listing agent delegated performance. See Stortroen v. Beneficial Fin.
Co., 736 P.2d 391, 396 (Colo. 1987) (citing cases). If the showing broker defrauds the purchaser,
remedies available to the purchaser include rescission. Id. (quoting Molly Moore Romero,
Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability: Arizona’s Emerging Malpractice Doctrine, 20 ARIZ. L.
REV. 767, 773 n.33 (1978)). On the other hand, if a showing broker is characterized as the pur-
chaser’s agent, rescission will not be an available remedy if the showing broker defrauds the
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know that his representation about the painting was false and that he
made the representation negligently or even innocently. Bernard’s
representation, attributed to Isabella as his principal, provides Junius
with a basis on which to seek damages from Isabella for his loss or to
seek rescission of the purchase.10
Imputation also lurks in the legal background if we focus solely
on the contract-law analysis of this transaction and its consequences.
Junius might argue that Bernard’s statement about the painting con-
stituted an express warranty because it was an affirmation of fact re-
lating to the painting that became part of the bargain between
Isabella and Junius.11 The fact that the painting is a forgery would
breach the warranty and subject Isabella to liability to Junius for
breach of contract. Bernard would not be subject to liability because
he was not a party to the contract.12 Junius’s remedies for breach of
warranty do not depend on whether he can show that Bernard knew
that his statement about the painting was false when he made it,
which may make the breach of warranty theory attractive. If Junius
takes this route, his claim for breach of warranty would reach only
Isabella and the remedies for breach of warranty would not include
exemplary or punitive damages that may be available in an action for
fraud.13
purchaser. See id. (holding that where “there is no agency relationship between the seller and
the selling broker, but [there is an] agency relationship . . . between the buyer and the selling
broker, th[e] remedy of rescission is no longer available to the buyer because the ratification
doctrine would not be applicable” (quoting Romero, supra at 773 n.33)).
10. On liability for negligent and innocent misrepresentations, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 552B, 552C (1976).
11. Under U.C.C. § 2-313(a) (2002), a seller of goods creates an express warranty through
“[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods
and becomes part of the basis of the bargain . . . .” The express warranty so created is that “the
goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.” Id. An express warranty may be created
although the seller does not use such words as “warrant” or “guarantee”; but an affirmation that
goes only to “the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller’s opinion
or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.” Id. § 2-313(2).
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 320 (stating that a person who makes or
purports to make a contract on behalf of a disclosed principal is not a party to the contract). An
agent for a disclosed principal is not liable for nonperformance of a contract that the agent
makes on behalf of the principal. Id. § 328.
13. Depending on when Junius learns the truth, he may reject the painting when delivery is
tendered, see U.C.C. § 2-601, if he can do so within a “reasonable time” following tender of ac-
tual delivery, id. § 2-602(1). A buyer may rightfully reject goods that fail in any respect to con-
form to the contract. Id. § 2-601. If Junius learns the truth after he has accepted the painting, he
may revoke his acceptance “within a reasonable time after [he] discovers or should have discov-
ered the ground for it and before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not
caused by their own defects.” Id. § 2-608(2). A buyer may revoke acceptance when a noncon-
formity substantially impairs the value of goods to the buyer. Id. § 2-608(1). If a buyer rightfully
10DEDEMOTT 09/10/03  4:14 PM
Special Issue 2003]           A PRINCIPAL AND AN AGENT’S KNOWLEDGE 297
Isabella might resist Junius’s argument that Bernard’s statement
constituted a warranty on the basis that she did not intend to make
any warranty about the painting. Additionally, she might argue that
Bernard’s statement exceeded his authority to act on her behalf be-
cause she authorized him only to sell the painting, not to make factual
affirmations about it on her behalf. Isabella’s line of defense is likely
to fail. If Bernard had authority to sell the painting for Isabella, she is
charged with the legal consequences of representations that Bernard
makes that are incidental to the sale, so long as Junius had no reason
to doubt the truth of Bernard’s statement.14 Likewise, it is not a de-
fense to Isabella if she can establish that, while she authorized Ber-
nard to make factual affirmations about the painting, his authority
encompassed only true affirmations.15 Having deployed Bernard as
her representative for purposes of selling the painting, Isabella be-
comes subject to the legal consequences of the means Bernard uses.
The basic illustrations both involve typical transactions and legal
consequences stemming from imputation. Additionally, both involve
a kind of fact that is typical in cases involving imputation. This is a
fact, known by an agent, that most principals would prefer not to be
true or, if true, a fact that many principals would prefer not to know.
Isabella would prefer that it not be so that Maisie holds an unre-
corded lien against property that Isabella purchases and, if it were so
that Maisie holds such a lien, Isabella would prefer not to know about
the lien. Less typically, imputation may benefit a principal. For exam-
ple, material facts known to an agent may establish that the agent
acted reasonably when the law requires reasonable action. Imputing
notice of those facts to the principal benefits the principal.16 Most im-
rejects goods or revokes acceptance of the goods, and the goods are unique, the buyer’s reme-
dies begin with the right to recover “so much of the price as has been paid” plus damages for
incidental and consequential loss. Id. §§ 2-711(1), 2-712(2). If Junius does not reject the painting
or revoke acceptance, his remedy is damages for the difference between the value of the paint-
ing as warranted and the value of the painting he accepted, plus any incidental or consequential
damages. Id. § 2-714(2).
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 162 (stating that a principal’s account-
ability under this section does not extend to statements an agent makes about his own author-
ity).
15. See id. § 162 cmt. b:
The authorization of the agent to make true statements concerning the subject matter
of a contract does not authorize him to make those which he knows or should know
are untrue. If the agent is authorized to make representations concerning a certain
matter, however, the principal is responsible for them if untrue statements are made.
16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. c(ii) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2003)
(noting that such imputed reasonable behavior affects the principal’s underlying tort liability).
Imputation may also have the consequence of creating a defense against a fraud claim. Suppose
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putation cases, though, involve facts that will not be beneficial to the
principal’s legal position if the principal is charged with an agent’s
knowledge of them.
The basic illustrations are also typical because the facts known to
an agent are relevant to the values to be exchanged in the two trans-
actions. Often the facts that an agent knows are relevant to the price
and terms around which parties structure a transaction, or, more pre-
cisely, would structure the transaction if the facts were known to
them. In the second illustration, Junius will pay less for the painting if
he knows that it is a well-executed forgery and he will pay more if he
believes it to be a Vermeer. If Isabella is shielded from the legal con-
sequences of Bernard’s knowledge, her dealings with Junius will not
reflect material facts relevant to the painting’s value and their trans-
action will be mispriced. Similarly, in the first illustration, Maisie’s
lien is relevant to the price that a buyer will pay for Henry’s property
and to the terms that an informed buyer will demand.
Although Bernard did not do so, an agent may disclose the exis-
tence of bad facts like these to the principal. An agent ordinarily has a
duty to disclose material facts to the principal on whose behalf the
agent acts.17 Other ramifications of the duty of disclosure are dis-
cussed below, but notice as an initial matter that a basic consequence
of imputation is to charge a principal with notice of facts whether or
not an agent has fulfilled the agent’s duty of disclosure or has
breached the duty.
Why might Bernard breach his duty of disclosure? An agent’s
breach of duty subjects the agent to liability to the principal for loss
the principal suffers as a result of the agent’s breach.18 An agent may
breach the duty of disclosure because the agent does not understand
the significance of the facts in question. However, as the illustrations
that Bernard acts as Junius’s agent, that Bernard knows that the purported Vermeer is a for-
gery, and that neither Isabella nor Junius know this. Imputing Bernard’s knowledge to Junius
would defeat Junius’s claim against Isabella and would leave Bernard as the sole defendant that
Junius may pursue. See, e.g., Jay Group, Inc. v. Glasgow, 534 S.E.2d 233, 236–37 (N.C. App.),
appeal denied, 546 S.E.2d 100, 100 (N.C. 2000) (imputing to an acquiring corporation its officers'
knowledge that trademarks of the acquired corporation could not be registered and rejecting
the acquiring corporation’s fraud claim based on failure to disclose).
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to use reasonable efforts to give
his principal information which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him and which, as the
agent has notice, the principal would desire to have and which can be communicated
without violating a superior duty to a third person.
18. See id. § 401 (subjecting an agent to liability “for loss caused to the principal by any
breach of duty”).
10DEDEMOTT 09/10/03  4:14 PM
Special Issue 2003]           A PRINCIPAL AND AN AGENT’S KNOWLEDGE 299
are structured, this is not likely to be a plausible explanation for Ber-
nard’s failure to make disclosure to Isabella. Bernard might fail to
make disclosure to Isabella when he fears that Isabella will not pro-
ceed with the transactions with Henry and Junius if she knows what
Bernard knows. If Bernard’s claim to compensation depends on com-
pleting a transaction, his desire to be paid may supersede his compli-
ance with duties he owes his principal, Isabella, as well as duties he
owes to other parties, including Junius, the purchaser of the painting.
Bernard may place a higher value on the prospect of immediate pay-
ment for his services than he does on the more remote prospect that
Isabella or Junius will sue him. He would be especially likely to do so
if he believes that Junius and Isabella (and Maisie for that matter) are
unlikely to discover that they have been injured or that they are un-
likely to assert their rights promptly or effectively.
Imputation also recognizes the possibility that a principal might
have instructed an agent not to disclose bad facts to the principal by
explicitly or implicitly making it clear to the agent that the principal
would prefer not to know. Thus, if Bernard reasonably understands
that Isabella wishes not to know about forgeries and unrecorded
liens, his failure to tell her may not breach his duty to her. Isabella
might indicate that she prefers not to be burdened with this knowl-
edge if she, too, places a high value on the immediate benefits that
she believes will flow from the transaction relative to the prospect
that Junius and Maisie will discover their injuries promptly. The like-
lihood that some agents act as they do because they reasonably un-
derstand that the principal so wishes helps explain the infrequency
with which principals bring actions against agents when what appears
to be a breach of duty by the agent has resulted in loss for the princi-
pal.19 To be sure, other factors also help explain the infrequency with
which principals seek indemnity from agents, but the implicit terms of
19. In particular, when an agent is an employee and the loss is a consequence of inadver-
tent error, a principal may be concerned about the impact on work-force morale. One line of
attack on an employer’s right of indemnity against an employee is that no employee expressly or
impliedly undertakes to be infallible. See Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Lister, [1956] 2
Q.B. 180, 187 (Eng. C.A.) (Denning, L.J., dissenting) (“No man, if asked, would give a warranty
to his employer that he would at all times, without exception, come up to the standard of the
reasonable man of the law who, so far as I know, when he is driving, never makes a slip or a mis-
take.”). In the same case, the House of Lords unanimously held that an employee owes a con-
tractual duty of care to the employer and that breach of the duty gives rise to a claim for dam-
ages by the employer. See Lister v. Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co., 1957 A.C. 555, 556 (1956)
(holding a truck driver liable to his employer for damages caused by breaching his duty of care).
For a critique of the implied contract theory, see generally Roscoe T. Steffen, The Employer’s
“Indemnity” Action, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 465 (1958).
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understanding as between agent and principal may inhibit the princi-
pal’s willingness to move against the agent.
However, from the standpoint of Maisie and Junius, it is not a
source of comfort that Isabella and Bernard may have reached a pri-
vate understanding that restricts what Bernard tells Isabella. Charg-
ing Isabella with the legal consequences of Bernard’s knowledge does
not require that Maisie or Junius prove the actual facts of any private
understanding that Isabella and Bernard may have had. Imputation,
that is, does not turn on whether a third party can establish explicit
collusion between a principal and an agent or an implicit under-
standing that the agent will shield the principal from knowledge of
bad facts. It would often be difficult for a third party to establish the
facts of the operative understanding between a principal and an
agent, especially when neither has reason to betray the other. It is
also possible that an agent may withhold information from a principal
because the agent misunderstands the principal’s wishes. Imputation
makes it unnecessary for a third party to establish that the principal
directed or authorized the agent to withhold material information.
III.  WHEN DOES AN AGENT KNOW A FACT?
It is possible to draw many shadings of degree within the concept
of knowledge.20 The most basic distinction for our present purposes is
between (1) a fact that a person knows or has reason to know on the
basis of an inference reasonably to be drawn from facts known; and
(2) a fact that a person should know because the person would know
the fact if the person discharged a duty owed to another person. To
illustrate this distinction, consider a variation on the first illustration.
Suppose that Henry, who owns the property that Isabella purchases,
retains Dora to represent him in selling the property. As it happens,
Dora resides in the same neighborhood and knows that, periodically,
high winds whip through it and damage structures. Even if Dora
claims to lack actual knowledge that Henry’s property is also suscep-
20. An English court stated five possibilities:
(i) [a]ctual knowledge; (ii) wilfully shutting one’s eyes to the obvious; (iii) wilfully and
recklessly failing to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable man would make;
(iv) knowledge of circumstances which would indicate the facts to an honest and rea-
sonable man; (v) knowledge of circumstances which would put an honest and reason-
able man on inquiry.
Baden v. Société Générale, [1993] 1 W.L.R. 509, 575–76.
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tible to wind damage, Dora has reason to know this fact.21 Likewise,
suppose Dora inspects a building on Henry’s property and notices
small piles of sawdust around the building’s foundation. Dora
knows—either as a consequence of her training as a real estate agent
or though her experience as a property owner or otherwise—that the
sawdust is indicative of termite infestation. However, not wanting to
delay the transaction, Dora does not check further. Dora has reason
to know of the strong likelihood that the building is to some degree
infested by termites because she has “received sufficient information
to awaken inquiry.”22
In both cases, Henry is charged with reason to know the facts
that Dora has reason to know, even though Dora claims that she
lacked actual knowledge of any termite infestation or adverse wind
conditions that afflicted Henry’s property. As a consequence, Henry
may be subject to liability to Isabella, who purchased Henry’s prop-
erty. Restricting imputation to facts of which an agent has actual
knowledge would make it attractive for agents to ignore or turn a
blind eye to facts that the agent would prefer not to know, often be-
cause the agent believes that the principal would prefer not to know
the facts. A phrase in English cases, “blind-eye knowledge,”23 nicely
captures scenarios in which a person knows enough of the facts to
know that further inquiry may lead conclusively to bad news.
In contrast, suppose Dora makes no investigation at all of the
condition of Henry’s property. Dora thus lacks knowledge of the in-
dicia of termite infestation. This may be a fact that Dora “should
know” because she has a duty to Henry to inspect the property. Dora
may also have a duty, as may Henry, that is owed to anyone who pur-
21. For comparable facts, see Carter v. Gugliuzzi, 716 A.2d 17, 20 (Vt. 1998) (imputing to a
brokerage house its agent’s knowledge of a property’s susceptibility to “frequent and severe
winds”).
22. Southport Little League v. Vaughn, 734 N.E.2d 261, 275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (citing
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Eviston, 37 N.E.2d 310, 316 (Ind. App. 1941)).
23. In the English cases, “blind-eye knowledge” refers to situations under policies of mari-
time insurance in which an insured or its agent suspects the existence of facts that mean that a
ship is unseaworthy but consciously refrains from further inquiry. See The Eurysthenes, 1977
Q.B. 49, 68 (1976) (Denning, L.J.) (stating that blind-eye knowledge requires proof “that a rea-
sonably prudent owner in [the owner’s] place would have known the facts and have realized that
the ship was not reasonably fit to be sent to sea”). To turn a blind eye to a situation does not
always imply conduct that is morally dubious. Consider Horatio Nelson’s naval victory over the
French at the battle of Copenhagen in 1801. Lord Nelson’s superiors hoisted signal flags direct-
ing him to retreat. However, “Nelson . . . made a deliberate decision to place the telescope to his
blind eye in order to avoid seeing what he knew he would see if he placed it to his good eye.”
Manifest Shipping Co. v. Uni-Polaris Ins. Co., [2001] 2 W.L.R. 170, 208 (H.L.).
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chases the property, to inspect the property and disclose the findings
of the inspection. Dora’s failure to inspect the property thus may
breach a duty she owes to Isabella, the purchaser of the property, and
may also breach a duty she owes to Henry. Like a cascading line of
dominoes, Dora’s breach of duty will cause Henry to breach any duty
he owes to Isabella to inspect the property prior to selling it if Henry
relies solely on Dora to do the inspection. Henry may thus be subject
to liability to Isabella.
This result does not turn on imputation, in this instance imputa-
tion of knowledge of a fact that Dora neither knows nor has reason to
know but “should know” to fulfill her duty. Henry would be subject
to liability to Isabella if Henry owes Isabella a duty and Henry has
delegated performance of the duty to Dora, who did not fulfill the
duty.24
An additional question is whether an agent should be deemed to
know what the principal knows—whether imputation, in other words,
operates only unidirectionally, upward from agent to principal, or
downward as well, from principal to agent. Suppose Isabella knows
that the painting she sells to Junius as a Vermeer is a nineteenth-
century forgery but also knows that Bernard (and Junius) do not
know this and believe the painting to be genuine. Bernard sells the
painting on Isabella’s behalf to Junius. Is Bernard subject to liability
to Junius? Recall that when it is Bernard who knows that the painting
is a forgery, Isabella is charged with Bernard’s knowledge and is sub-
ject to liability to Junius for fraud, as is Bernard. If Isabella’s knowl-
edge were imputed downward to Bernard, Bernard would be subject
to liability to Junius.
Cases with facts comparable to this hypothetical do not impute a
principal’s knowledge downward to the agent.25 This limit on imputa-
tion protects an agent from the legal consequences of facts that only
the principal knows or has reason to know. Otherwise, an agent
would risk liability whenever the principal, for whatever reason, has
more information than does the agent about a transaction executed
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 277 cmt. b (1958):
The principal is affected by information which the agent should have acquired if the
principal has a contractual or other duty to third persons with respect to a matter en-
trusted to the agent. In such cases the principal is subject to liability for failing to act in
the light of information which he should have acquired if he himself had done the
work.
25. See, e.g., Ago v. Begg, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 613, 617–18 (D.D.C. 1988) (“[T]he law of
agency . . . sensibly does not hold agents responsible for knowledge known only by the princi-
pal.” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 911 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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by the agent. However, does the unidimensional quality of imputation
also provide a defense to the principal? May Isabella argue that she is
not subject to liability to Junius for fraud because her agent in the
transaction, Bernard, did not know that his statement to Junius was
false? If so, principals would systematically find it attractive to shelter
their agents from facts most likely to be material to the transactions in
which any particular agent may be engaged. The cases foreclose this
possibility. Isabella may be subject to liability to Junius if she with-
holds material information from Bernard, knowing that he will mis-
state material facts to Junius or another third party as a result.26 How-
ever, Isabella’s liability does not turn on imputing her knowledge to
Bernard or imputing notice to her of a fact that Bernard does not
know. The basis for Isabella’s liability is that she has used Bernard, an
innocent instrumentality, to mislead Junius.27 Isabella’s use of Ber-
nard, who says what Isabella predicts he will say to Junius but does
not know that what he says is false, is comparable to Isabella pre-
senting Junius with a published catalog that Isabella knows attributes
the painting to Vermeer, when the author of the catalog, like Ber-
nard, did not know the true story. 
26. See Essex v. Getty Oil Co., 661 S.W.2d 544, 550–51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (“The fact that
the person used as an agent to convey the representation is innocent does not relieve the party
charged with fraud.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 256 (assigning liability to a
principal for failing to reveal material facts to an agent who, “because of his justifiable igno-
rance . . . makes a material misstatement of facts”).
27. Some authorities treat downward imputation as a device to establish liability on the
part of the principal, not the agent. For an early example, see JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AS A BRANCH OF COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME JURISPRUDENCE,
WITH OCCASIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE CIVIL AND FOREIGN LAW § 140d (N. St. John
Green ed., 8th ed. 1874):
notice of facts to the principal is ordinarily notice thereof to the agent; for it is the duty
of the principal to communicate to his agent notice of the facts which come to his
knowledge, touching the matter of the agency; and if the principal suffers any loss or
injury by want of such notice, he suffers by his own fault; and if the other party is in-
jured thereby, he ought to have correspondent redress. The law, therefore, imputes the
knowledge of the principal to be the knowledge of the agent . . . .
(footnote omitted).
In contemporary contexts defined by a regulatory statute, some courts have imputed notice
of facts known by a principal downward to an agent when the principal has a duty to transmit all
material facts to the agent and the statute’s regulatory purpose would be undermined by limited
disclosure to agents. This reasoning has been applied to the portion of the federal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act which prohibits communication by a debt collector to a consumer if the
collector knows the consumer is represented by a lawyer. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) (2000). See
Powers v. Prof’l Credit Serv., Inc., 107 F. Supp. 2d 166, 169 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Knowledge can
be imputed to the debt collector when the creditor [principal] has such knowledge and fails to
convey it to its agent, the debt collector, at the time it seeks collection.”).
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IV.  THE PROVENANCE OF AGENTS’ KNOWLEDGE
Agents, like all persons, acquire knowledge through many differ-
ent means and in many settings. In particular, an agent may learn a
fact when the agent is acting on behalf of another principal or is act-
ing solely on the agent’s own behalf. The question is whether knowl-
edge that an agent acquires apart from an agency relationship should
be imputed to the principal. For example, suppose Bernard knows
about Maisie’s lien on Henry’s property because he learned about it
in an earlier transaction in which he represented another principal. If
he remembers the lien when he acquires the property for Isabella, is
his knowledge imputed to Isabella? She might well argue that Ber-
nard, although acting as her agent in acquiring Henry’s property, was
not acting as her agent when he learned about Maisie’s lien. Or sup-
pose Bernard learns about Maisie’s lien, or learns that the purported
Vermeer is a forgery, at a dinner party with friends. Should Isabella
be charged with knowledge Bernard acquires when he is not working
for any principal?
On this point, English cases give weight to the provenance of an
agent’s knowledge.28 In the most memorable case, Société Général v.
Tramways Union Co., Ltd., a company’s secretary learned that shares
in the company were subject to an equitable charge when, on the day
of a relative’s funeral, he learned of the charge at a family session
where the solicitor for the relative’s executor read out the decedent’s
will and an agreement creating the charge to those assembled.29 The
court held that notice of the charge should not be imputed to the
company because “[t]he secretary was in no way representing the
company at the funeral; no notice was given to him as the agent of the
company, nor did he acquire any knowledge of the defendant’s secu-
rity whilst transacting the company’s business, or in any way for or on
behalf of the company.”30
In contrast, for the most part, U.S. cases focus on whether an
agent’s knowledge is material to the agent’s duties to the principal but
not on the circumstances under which the agent acquired the informa-
tion, unless the agent learned the knowledge under circumstances
creating a duty of confidentiality to another party.31 For example, a
28. See REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 442 n. 89 (referring to several common law decisions).
29. Société Général de Paris v. Tramways Union Co., Ltd., 1884 Q.B.D. 424.
30. Id. at 450 (Lindley, L.J.).
31. See, e.g., Carter v. Gugliuzzi, 716 A.2d 17, 23 (Vt. 1998) (affirming the conclusion that
the agent’s knowledge was imputable to his principal “regardless of [its] source”); Daniel S.
Kleinberger, Guilty Knowledge, 22 WM . MITCHELL L. REV. 953 (1996) (describing as “without
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lawyer’s knowledge is not imputed to a client when communicating
the knowledge would breach the lawyer’s duty to another client.32
Unless an agent is bound by a duty of confidentiality to another per-
son, and unless agent and principal have agreed otherwise, the agent’s
duty to the principal encompasses transmitting all material informa-
tion known by the agent, regardless of its origin.33 Thus, Bernard’s
duty to Isabella requires disclosure of Maisie’s lien, regardless of the
circumstances under which Bernard learned about it, assuming the
absence of agreement between Isabella and Bernard that he will
spare her such unpleasantries. Dora has a duty to tell Henry about
the perilous wind conditions that may afflict Henry’s property, al-
though Dora learned about the high winds as a consequence of living
in the same neighborhood where Henry’s property is situated.
Likewise, on the facts of Société Général, the duty of disclosure
owed to the company by its secretary would encompass the secre-
tary’s knowledge of the charge on shares issued by the company if
material to the company and the secretary’s position within it. It
would be beside the point that the secretary learned about the charge
at a family funeral. He attended the funeral as a member of the fam-
ily, and not as a representative of the company, as the court observed.
However, “the mind of the agent cannot be divided into compart-
ments.”34 To be sure, agency law could so compartmentalize an
basis either in precedent or policy” a requirement that information imputed to a principal be
acquired by the agent while acting within the scope of his employment); Warren A. Seavey, No-
tice Through an Agent, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14 (1916) (“[I]t is immaterial how or when the ser-
vant or agent acquires the information . . . .”). Examples to the contrary include R.B.Z. v. War-
wick Dev. Co., 725 So.2d 261, 264 (Ala. 1998) (declining to impute to a principal knowledge
gained by an agent prior to and outside the scope of his agency); Engen v. Mitch’s Bar & Grill,
No. C7-95-78, 1995 WL 387738, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 3, 1995) (holding that the party
seeking to impute the agent’s knowledge to the principal must establish that the agent acquired
the knowledge while acting within the course and scope of his employment).
32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 28(1) (2000). See also
Reinninger v. Prestige Fabricators, 523 S.E.2d 720, 725–26 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that
the knowledge of a company physician, who had an ethical duty to withhold confidential com-
munications of employee-patients, is not imputed to the employer). This limit on an agent’s duty
of disclosure is recognized in Kelly v. Cooper, 1993 A.C. 205, 214 (P.C. 1992) (appeal taken
from Berm.) (“It cannot be sensibly suggested that an estate agent is contractually bound to dis-
close to any one of his principals information which is confidential to another of his princi-
pals.”).
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958):
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to use reasonable efforts to give
his principal information which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him and which, as the
agent has notice, the principal would desire to have and which can be communicated
without violating a superior duty to a third person.
34. Id. § 276 cmt. a; see also FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY
1391 (2d ed. 1914) (observing that the real justification for imputation is “found in the convic-
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agent’s mind, but the consequence would be an implausible fiction.
Principals often choose their agents on the basis of an agent’s prior
experiences and life apart from work. A principal may well choose an
agent on the basis of the prospective agent’s prior work, education,
and life experience more generally, precisely because they contribute
skills and knowledge that the agent may bring to bear on work for the
principal. Moreover, it’s likely that an agent will attempt to transmit
information to the principal, regardless of its provenance, when the
agent believes that the principal wishes to be told.
Thus, under U.S. law, more of an agent’s knowledge is imputed
to the principal than under English law, suggesting that under U.S.
law an agent’s duties appear to reach more pervasively into prior or
private dimensions of the agent’s life. However, it is open to question
whether a contemporary English court, in contrast to the 1884 Société
Général court, would so broadly foreclose imputation on the basis of
the circumstances under which the agent acquired knowledge mate-
rial to the agent’s duties. Suppose the question arises as a conse-
quence of a representation made on the principal’s behalf to induce
another party to enter into a transaction with it, and not, as in Société
Général, when the question is the validity or priority of rights that
may be asserted against property. For example, suppose that the
company that issued the shares entered into a financing transaction
with a third party and, as part of that transaction, warranted that it
knew of no equitable liens upon its shares. If as a consequence of the
statement the company is subject to liability for fraud to the third
party, the breadth of Société Général’s emphasis on the provenance of
the agent’s knowledge has been undercut.
As it happens, English cases impose liability on principals when
it is very unlikely that the agent has transmitted relevant information
to the principal. In a 1912 case, Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co.,35 the
House of Lords held that a principal was liable for its agent’s fraud
when the agent fraudulently induced a client to convey her invest-
ment assets to him.36 Although the agent disposed of the assets for his
own benefit, having engineered the entire transaction for his own
gain, the principal was liable even though it neither knew about nor
benefited from its agent’s fraud because the fraud occurred in the
tion that it cannot be tolerated that an agent shall act in a transaction, with his mind full of ma-
terial knowledge respecting it, and yet the principal be wholly unaffected by that knowledge,
merely because the agent happened to acquire it before the agency began”).
35. [1912] A.C. 716.
36. Id. at 735-36.
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course of the agency.37 From the standpoint of the client who dealt
with the firm through its agent, the transaction appeared to be within
the scope of those the agent had authority to conduct for the firm;
that the agent acted for “private motives” in contrast to the interests
of the firm should not defeat the firm’s liability.38 Curiously, the na-
ture of the agent’s “private motives” in Lloyd v. Grace Smith make it
even less likely that the agent will reveal material information to the
principal than the extramural circumstances under which the com-
pany secretary learned about the charge in Société Général.
V.  LAPSED MEMORY
A separate dimension of knowledge is the phenomenon of for-
getting; agents who are individuals may forget what they once knew.
This may be due to the passage of time or because the agent acquired
the knowledge in question in a superficial manner that was not con-
ducive to long-term retention in the agent’s memory. For example,
suppose Bernard represents many principals in transactions compa-
rable to the transaction through which he learned about Maisie’s lien
on Henry’s property. Bernard’s knowledge of the lien may prove
ephemeral if he acquires it through one of a series of routine transac-
tions.39 Moreover, before Bernard represents Isabella, he owes her no
duty to retain facts in his memory.
Thus, a principal is not deemed to know a fact that an agent once
knew but has forgotten by the time the agent acts on the principal’s
behalf.40 One possible difficulty with this limit on imputation is that
37. Id. at 732, 736–41.
38. Id. at 740.
39. E.g., Constant v. Univ. of Rochester, 19 N.E. 631, 634 (N.Y. 1889). Constant involved
an attorney who had acted as an agent for the University of Rochester in recording a mortgage
on a property to which it had acquired title at a foreclosure sale eleven months earlier. Id. The
attorney had also acted as an agent for the plaintiff, who had a mortgage on property that was
not recorded at the time of the foreclosure sale. Id. The court found that the facts tended
strongly to show that the agent had no recollection at all of the prior mortgage because the
agent did an “enormous amount of business” for the plaintiff “of this same general nature,” the
earlier mortgage preceded the later mortgage by a significant period of time, and the earlier
mortgage instrument itself was stored in the agent’s office with satisfied mortgages. Id.
40. See, e.g., Chicagoland Vending, Inc. v. Parkside Ctr., Ltd., 454 S.E.2d 456, 458 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that an agent’s previously-acquired knowledge is imputed to a subsequent
principal only when the agent has the information in mind in dealing for the subsequent princi-
pal, or when the agent acquired the information so recently as to warrant the assumption that
the agent’s mind still retained the information). A partnership is charged with the knowledge of
a partner acting on a matter “acquired while a partner or then present to his mind” except in the
case of a fraud on the partnership committed by or with consent of that partner. UNIF. P’SHIP
ACT § 12 (1914). A partner’s knowledge is “effective immediately as knowledge by” the part-
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instances of claimed forgetfulness on the part of agents tend to in-
volve knowledge that, if imputed to a principal, would have an ad-
verse effect on the principal’s legal relations with third parties. It may
be difficult for a third party to show that an agent in fact remembered
the information, just as it may be difficult for a third party to show
that an agent duly transmitted material information to the principal.
Some cases address this problem with a presumption that information
an agent has recently acquired is known by the agent when the agent
acts on behalf of the principal.41 Other cases explicitly allocate to the
third party the burden of showing that the agent knew the informa-
tion at the time of acting on the principal’s behalf.42 The first ap-
proach is preferable. It can be attractive to forget “bad facts,” or to
claim to have forgotten them, once the consequences after-the-fact of
knowledge become evident. 
VI.  WHEN AN AGENT ACTS ADVERSELY TO A PRINCIPAL
A long standing-exception to imputation protects a principal
from an agent’s knowledge when the agent acted adversely to the
principal in the transaction or other matter. However, the U.S. cases
charge the principal with the adversely-acting agent’s knowledge
when the principal retains a benefit from the agent’s actions, knowing
the circumstances of the agent’s conduct. The principal is also
nership except in the case of fraud on the partnership committed by or with consent of the part-
ner. Id. § 102(f) (1997).
41. See, e.g., Pee Dee State Bank v. Prosser, 367 S.E.2d 708, 714 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988):
[As a general rule,] a principal is charged with the knowledge an agent acquired before
the relationship only when the knowledge can reasonably be said to have been in the
mind of the agent while acting for the principal or where he acquired it so recently as
to raise the presumption he still retained it in his mind.
Overruled on other grounds by United Carolina Bank v. Caroprop, Ltd., 446 S.E.2d 415, 417
(S.C. 1994).
42. See Constant, 19 N.E. at 633 (holding that a principal would be charged with knowledge
acquired by his agent in a prior transaction for another principal only “upon clear proof that the
knowledge . . . was present to [the agent’s] mind at the very time of the transaction in ques-
tion”); First Palmetto Sav. Bank v. Patel, 543 S.E.2d 241, 243 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (reiterating
the same principle). In Constant, the agent acquired property for the principal by purchasing
property at a mortgage foreclosure sale; in an earlier transaction, the agent represented the
plaintiff who took an unrecorded (but prior) mortgage on the same property. 19 N.E. at 633.
The agent’s duty to the second principal is a basis on which the court requires an affirmative
showing of knowledge at the time of the foreclosure sale; if the agent at that time knew about
the earlier recorded lien, the agent acted contrary to that principal’s interests in acquiring the
property. Id. This argument ignores the varied reasons why the agent might remember the ear-
lier mortgage but neglect to tell the principal. Indeed, if the agent acted with present knowledge
of the earlier mortgage, the agent’s acquisition of the property is contrary to the interests of the
second principal only if that principal is charged with the agent’s knowledge.
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charged with an adversely-acting agent’s knowledge when imputation
protects the interests of a third party who reasonably believed the
agent to be authorized and who did not know or have reason to know
that the agent acted adversely to the principal.43
This exception is tied to the underlying point that a principal is
not charged with an agent’s knowledge when doing so would defeat
claims that the principal may assert against the agent.44 Imputation is
not available as a mechanism through which an agent may defeat
claims that a principal would have against the agent. Likewise, a prin-
cipal is not charged with an agent’s knowledge when the agent has
dealt with the principal, and not with a third party on the principal’s
behalf.45 The “adverse interest” exception defeats imputation in a nar-
row range of cases involving third-party claims arising out of conduct
by an agent that is so wholly antagonistic to the principal’s interests
that the relationship between principal and agent could be viewed as
severed.46 In contrast, simply the fact that the agent acts with con-
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 282 (1958).
44. See, e.g., E. Trading Co. v. Refco, 229 F.3d 617, 624 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding it illogical
that the principal is responsible for all of the agent’s actions); Nerbonne, N.V. v. Lake Bryan
Int’l Props., 685 So. 2d 1029, 1032 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (same).
45. MECHEM, supra note 34, at 1403. The scope of the adverse interest exception has been
vigorously litigated in cases involving claims made by or on behalf of corporations against pro-
viders of professional services when the provider of professional services did not detect fraud
(or other breaches of duty) by the corporation’s officers. If an officer’s guilty knowledge is im-
puted to the corporation, the professional service provider may defend against a malpractice
claim on the basis that the corporation did not rely on the service provider’s opinion or audit.
See, e.g., Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 1982) (involving a case
of massive fraud within the Cenco Corporation and implicating the failure of Cenco’s auditors,
Seidman & Seidman, to report such fraud). An imputation defense does not protect a service
provider who is in cahoots with the officer. In many cases raising questions about imputation,
the plaintiff is a corporation’s receiver or trustee in bankruptcy. The common law of agency
does not answer the question whether such plaintiffs are identically subject to defenses available
against a corporate principal.
46. English cases appear to give wider scope to the exception. See generally Peter Watts,
Imputed Knowledge in Agency Law—Excising the Fraud Exception, 117 L.Q. REV. 300 (2001).
In particular, the English cases define adverse interest more broadly and do not limit the appli-
cability of the exception when the principal retains a benefit generated by the agent’s conduct.
See id. at 330–31 (citing the benefit rule as an example of the “more constrained career” of the
fraud exception in the United States).
In England, authority is not yet established for the distinction drawn in many cases in the
United States between an agent’s knowledge of a fact and whether an agent has received a noti-
fication from a third party. For support for the distinction see El Ajou v. Dollar Land Holdings
plc {1994} 2 All E.R. 685, 702-03. REYNOLDS, supra note 2, at 438–39 (“A notification given to
an agent is effective . . . whether or not it is subsequently transmitted to the principal . . . .”). A
notification is
a manifestation that is made in the form required by agreement among parties or ap-
plicable law, or in a reasonable manner in the absence of any agreement or applicable
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flicted motives or interests does not trigger the adverse-interest ex-
ception to imputation.47
It is possible to tie the scope of this exception to agency doctrine
more generally by focusing on the control that a principal has in a re-
lationship of agency. When an agent’s knowledge is not imputed to a
principal due to the adverse-interest exception, the agent’s conduct
tends to be explicable by factors outside the control and incentive
structures that the principal has created. Thus, in the earlier illustra-
tions, Bernard’s knowledge of Maisie’s lien is imputed to Isabella al-
though Bernard’s reason for failing to tell Isabella about the lien is his
fear that, if he does, he will lose his commission because Isabella will
refuse to purchase the property from Henry.48 Bernard has still ac-
complished Isabella’s objective, acquiring property for her museum,
albeit under circumstances that Isabella may well have reason to re-
gret. Moreover, Bernard’s reticence is a predictable consequence of
the incentive structure created by his agreement with Isabella, which
makes his commission dependent on consummating a transaction.
In contrast, suppose Bernard’s reticence occurs because Henry
bribes him not to reveal the fact of Maisie’s lien to Isabella.49 Isabella
is not charged with Bernard’s knowledge. Bernard’s failure to disclose
the lien to Isabella is a consequence of a third party’s inducement to
Bernard to breach the duty he owes Isabella and not a consequence
of the incentives and instructions implicit in the relationship between
Isabella and Bernard.50 However, Bernard’s knowledge may be im-
puted to Isabella when Bernard’s actions have the effect of defraud-
ing a third party who reasonably believes Bernard to be authorized,
as when Bernard induces Junius to buy Isabella’s painting by misrep-
resenting it to be a Vermeer. It is not a defense to Isabella that Ber-
law, with the intention of affecting the legal rights and duties of the notifier in relation
to rights and duties of persons to whom the notification is given.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.01(1) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002). A notification
given to an agent is effective against the principal if the agent had actual or apparent authority
to receive the notification, unless the person who receives the notification knows or has reason
to know that the agent is acting adversely to the principal. Id. § 5.02(1).
47. See MECHEM, supra note 34, at 1411 (“It is not enough to prevent the application of the
general rule [of imputation] that an agent to whom notice comes which would otherwise be im-
puted, shall, however wickedly or fraudulently, fail to communicate it to his principal.”).
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 282 illus. 4 (1958) (providing a similar ex-
ample with alternative terms).
49. See id. § 282 illus. 5 (providing a similar example with alternative terms).
50. If Maisie argues that Isabella should be charged with Bernard’s knowledge because
Isabella benefited from Bernard’s action, Isabella may rely on the fact that, at the time of her
purchase of the property from Henry, she paid value in good faith. See id. § 282 cmt. j.
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nard made the misrepresentation with motives antagonistic to her in-
terests, perhaps because Bernard has formed an alliance with the
forger that will reward Bernard, separate from his relationship with
Isabella as her agent.51 Independently, Isabella will be charged with
Bernard’s knowledge if she retains the benefit of his conduct, know-
ing the facts.52
One might wonder why an agent’s knowledge should be imputed
to a principal when the question surfaces in an action brought by a
third party alleging fraud but not when a third party challenges the
circumstances under which a principal acquired property from some-
one else. When the agent has acquired the knowledge extramurally or
prior to the agency relationship, most U.S. cases—unlike English
precedents—do not draw this distinction, as discussed above.53 The
question is whether this distinction is any more compelling when the
agent acts adversely to the principal. If an agent acts adversely to a
principal when the agent represents the principal in conducting a
transaction with a third party that defrauds the third party, the agent’s
fraud is imputed to the principal on the basis that the principal chose
to conduct the transaction with the agent as a representative and
manifested to the third party that the agent had authority. This out-
come sacrifices the innocent principal in the interest of protecting the
third party with whom the agent dealt on the principal’s behalf. How-
ever, the principal chose to deal through an agent, chose the agent,
and led the third party to believe that the agent had authority. The
third party’s injury stems from an interaction with an agent appar-
ently conducted on behalf of the principal. In contrast, when the
plaintiff is not a third party with whom the agent has transacted on
the principal’s behalf, the plaintiff’s injury or grievance is not linked
to such an interaction. The agent’s adverse interest places the agent
beyond the consequences fairly to be ascribed to the position of con-
trol over the agent.
VII.  TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IMPUTATION
Conventionally, imputation is justified on two bases that differ in
intellectual style as well as implications. First, it is said that imputa-
51. See id. cmt. f (“[A] principal may be liable for the fraud of an agent who is acting en-
tirely for his own purposes but who, to the defrauded party, is apparently acting for the princi-
pal.”).
52. See id. cmt. h (“This rule applies not only where the agent purports to act as agent in
obtaining the benefit for his principal, but also where he commits a fraud independently.”).
53. See supra notes 28–38 and accompanying text.
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tion can be justified on the basis of an identity that is assumed to exist
between principal and agent; a principal is charged with an agent’s
knowledge because principal and agent should be treated as sharing
the same legal identity or personality.54 A pragmatic supplement to
the formal argument from identity is that a principal should not, by
using an agent, be advantaged in position compared with the conse-
quences for the principal had the principal acted personally rather
than through an agent.55 Grounding agency doctrines on an identity
between principal and agent had an influential scholarly proponent,
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.56 Second, imputation is justified on the
basis that if an agent knows a fact and is under a duty to relay it to the
54. See, e.g., Stump v. Ind. Equip. Co., 601 N.E.2d 398, 403 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (“Imputed
knowledge is a tenet of agency law, and is based on an underlying legal fiction of agency—the
identity of principal and agent when the agent is engaged in the principal’s business.”).
55. Watts, supra note 46, at 305 (“[A] perverse incentive to conduct business through
agents rather than personally would be created were principals permitted to hide behind their
agents’ failures to communicate.”). There are bases for this argument apart from an identifica-
tion between agent and principal. For example, it is possible to focus on whether an act by the
knowledgeable agent is a requisite to a tie, most typically a transaction, between the principal
and the third party whose legal relations with the principal are at issue. See Peter Watts, The
Company’s Alter Ego-a Parvenu and Impostor in Private Law, N.Z. L. Rev. 137, 142-43 (2000).
56. On identification as the underlying basis for agency doctrine, see Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., Agency I, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345, 350 (1891). Holmes based his articles on lectures
he gave on agency “at the Law School of Harvard College” and printed them without substan-
tial revision several years later. See id. at 345. Holmes also discussed identification in The Com-
mon Law:
This notion of a fictitious unity of person has been pronounced a darkening of counsel
in a recent useful work. But it receives the sanction of Sir Henry Maine, and I believe
that it must stand as expressing an important aspect of the law, if, as I have tried to
show, there is no adequate and complete explanation of the modern law, except by the
survival in practice of rules which lost their true meaning when the objects of them
ceased to be slaves. There is no trouble in understanding what is meant by saying that
a slave has no legal standing, but is absorbed in the family which his master represents
before the law.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 183 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard
Univ. Press 1963) (1881). Holmes’s account does not address the duties an agent owes a princi-
pal.
As it happens, Holmes did not think agency had much intellectual substance as a body of
doctrine. He characterized agency doctrine as the simple-minded result of combining the fiction
of identity between principal and agent with common sense. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
Agency II, 5 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1892). Holmes closed this article with the pessimistic conclu-
sion that it was not possible to resolve the outcomes of agency cases “into mere applications of
general and accepted principles.” See id. at 23. In contrast, the Reporter who completed the first
and second Restatement of Agency began an article on the optimistic note that
I believe that Justice Holmes overestimates the effect of the fictions. On the contrary I
believe that the results reached by the courts can be explained without using legal pre-
sumptions as axioms and that individual cases may be tested by the use of judicial
sense (rather than common sense) and the needs of commerce. On the whole the in-
terests concerned have been well protected . . . .
Warren A. Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 YALE L.J. 859, 859 (1920).
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principal, it can be assumed that the agent has fulfilled that duty.57
Characterizing this presumption as the basis for imputation also had a
prominent champion, Joseph Story.58
Both justifications have strengths. It is appealing to base imputa-
tion on an identification between principal and agent because an
agent’s actions bind the principal—are treated as the acts of the prin-
cipal—when the agent acts with actual or apparent authority. A prin-
cipal’s agents link the principal to the external world though the facts
they learn about it, as well as through their actions. However, this jus-
tification has significant limits. It does not reflect the fact that princi-
pal and agent retain separate legal personalities. Each owes duties to
the other and to third parties with whom the agent interacts on the
principal’s behalf. 
Additionally, less than all of an agent’s knowledge is imputed to
the principal. As explained above, a principal is not charged with the
knowledge of an agent who acts adversely to the principal, nor with
57. See, e.g., Apollo Fuel Oil v. United States, 195 F.3d 74, 76–77 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying
the principle that, “[i]n general, when an agent is employed to perform certain duties for his
principal and acquires knowledge material to those duties, the agent’s knowledge is imputed to
the principal,” in finding a strong inference that whoever introduced red-dyed diesel fuel into
the tank of a truck did so to benefit the corporation by enabling it to evade an excise tax pay-
able on clear fuel used for transportation); Triple A Mgmt. Co. v. Frisone, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669,
678–79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (acknowledging that the basis for imputing an agent’s knowledge to
the principal “is that the agent has a legal duty to disclose information obtained in the course of
the agency and material to the subject matter of the agency, and the agent will be presumed to
have fulfilled this duty”).
58. See STORY, supra note 27, § 140:
[N]otice of facts to an agent is constructive notice thereof to the principal himself,
where it arises from, or is at the time connected with, the subject-matter of his agency;
for, upon general principles of public policy, it is presumed that the agent has commu-
nicated such facts to the principal; and if he has not, still the principal, having intrusted
the agent with the particular business, the other party has a right to deem his acts and
knowledge obligatory upon the principal; otherwise, the neglect of the agent, whether
designed or undesigned, might operate most injuriously to the rights and interests of
such party.
The first edition of Story’s treatise was published in 1839.
Interestingly, the eighth edition of Story’s treatise was revised by Nicholas St. John Green,
an associate of Holmes’s. See LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 201 (2001). Green, a
law professor at Harvard like Holmes, was a critic of legal formalism and thought that all beliefs
had a “purposive character—that knowledge is not a passive mirroring of the world, but an ac-
tive means of making the world into the kind of world we want it to be.” Id. at 223–25. In the
Metaphysical Club, Holmes and Green joined conversational forces in the 1870s along pragma-
tist lines with William James, Chauncey Wright, C.S. Peirce, and others. See id. at 201–30.
Green left Harvard for Boston University, reportedly in disgust when legal formalism came
to dominate the curriculum following the appointment of Christopher Columbus Langdell as
Dean. Id. at 231. Nonetheless, Green’s work on Story’s treatise does not indicate any disagree-
ment with the fiction of imputation, including downward imputation of a principal’s knowledge
to an agent. See STORY, supra.
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the knowledge of an agent who owes another party a duty of confi-
dentiality. That there are limits on the scope of imputation is inconsis-
tent with treating identification between principal and agent as the
underlying justification for imputation. A further inconsistency is that
imputation is not a two-way doctrine because notice of facts known to
a principal is not imputed to the agent. If, for example, Isabella knows
that the painting in the second illustration is a forgery but Bernard
does not know this, Isabella’s knowledge is not imputed to Bernard.
The one-way direction of imputation is not consistent with identifica-
tion between principal and agent.
To be sure, a more nuanced account of identity can overcome
some of these objections. Some forms of identity involve constitutive
relationships between parts and a whole. By way of analogy, a bas-
ketball team scores whenever one of its members makes a basket, but
we wouldn’t say that whenever the team scores, any particular mem-
ber does. Thus, the one-way direction of imputation isn’t fatal to
grounding imputation in an identification between principal and
agent. Moreover, to say that there is an identity does not necessitate
that the identity hold true for all purposes and all circumstances; after
all, the agency relationship between Bernard and Isabella is itself
limited in scope. The adverse-interest exception to imputation could
then be rationalized as applying to situations in which an identity be-
tween principal and agent does not hold.
However, even with this modification, positing an identification
between principal and agent does not quite capture the distinction
drawn by the cases between situations in which an agent deals with
the third party whose legal relations are at issue, as opposed to situa-
tions in which there is no such dealing. When Bernard sells the forged
painting to Junius, having allied his interests with those of the forger,
as between Junius and Isabella, Isabella is charged with Bernard’s
knowledge of the forgery. When Bernard buys property from Henry
knowing of Maisie’s unrecorded lien but does not tell Isabella about
the lien because Henry bribes him to remain silent, as between Maisie
and Isabella, Isabella is not charged with Bernard’s knowledge of the
lien. Perhaps for the purposes that imputation serves, the identifica-
tion between Bernard and Isabella is inseverable when Bernard rea-
sonably appears to the third party with whom he deals, and whose le-
gal relations with Isabella are at issue, to be dealing on Isabella’s
behalf. This explanation looks beyond the postulate of identification
to its purpose in a given context.
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Most contemporary cases, in contrast, tie imputation to the du-
ties an agent owes a principal, stressing the agent’s duty to transmit
material facts to the principal. The chief attraction of this justification
is that it is reasonable to believe that, in most cases, agents fulfill this
duty, and often have done so even when in retrospect principal or
agent claims otherwise. It is also reasonable to assume that it will be
difficult in many instances for a third party to prove that an agent
transmitted material information to the principal. However, justifying
imputation on the basis of an agent’s duty to a principal does not
match well with significant aspects of well-settled doctrine. It is not a
defense to a principal that an agent breached the agent’s duty to
transmit relevant information, even when the principal can establish
that the agent withheld the information. Moreover, the U.S. cases
charge a principal with an agent’s material information whether or
not the agent owed the principal a duty when the agent acquired the
information.
Most tellingly, a principal is charged with an agent’s knowledge
of material facts even when the agent’s failure to transmit the facts to
the principal is consistent with instructions that the principal has
given the agent. That is, if a fact is material to a principal’s legal rela-
tions with a third party, the principal cannot defeat imputation on the
basis that the agent complied with the principal’s instructions in with-
holding the fact from the principal. Thus, an agent’s duty to a princi-
pal does not fully explain why the agent’s knowledge is imputed to
the principal.
VIII.  ALTERNATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS
It is more promising to treat imputation as a recognition of the
fact that, when an agent interacts with third parties on behalf of a
principal, the internal relationship between principal and agent
shapes many dimensions of the agent’s interaction with the third
party. A principal has the power to select its agents and, in various
ways, to exercise control over them. A principal’s position enables the
principal to furnish agents with instructions and incentives with the
objective of guiding their conduct. This includes prescribing routines
for how agents should handle information, as well as determining how
best to reward agents who transmit material information.
As noted above, in most cases involving imputation, what is
known to the agent is not favorable to the principal’s legal position
vis-à-vis a third party if the principal also knows the fact. Imputation
responds to the evident temptation for agents to be reticent in sharing
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“bad facts” with their principals. An agent may be reticent about such
a fact for many reasons, including the agent’s belief that the principal
would prefer not to know the fact. An agent’s relationship with the
principal provides many channels for the principal so to inform the
agent, both explicitly and implicitly. Additionally, by setting an incen-
tive structure for an agent, the principal may make it more likely that
the agent will not reveal “bad facts” to the principal, as when the
agent fears the principal will not conclude a transaction if the princi-
pal knows the facts and the agent’s right to compensation depends on
whether a transaction is consummated.
It is also possible that a principal may find it tempting to either
embrace or disavow an agent, depending on how the agent’s interac-
tion with a third party actually turns out. For example, as the seller of
a painting purported to be a Vermeer, Isabella will benefit if Junius
does not learn that painting is a forgery, whether or not Isabella actu-
ally knows or suspects the truth. She may anticipate that benefit in
how she deals with Bernard as her agent, for example by failing to en-
courage Bernard to be candid with prospective purchasers and by re-
warding Bernard on the basis of the amount of sale proceeds he gen-
erates. Isabella and Bernard may also benefit if Junius’s discovery of
the truth is delayed. If (and when) Junius learns about the forgery,
Isabella would, of course, prefer to distance herself from Bernard and
the guilty knowledge that only he demonstrably has.
Imputation has the effect of denying principals an opportunity to
deal with third parties on the basis that “heads I win, tails you lose,”
as determined by a principal after-the-fact of transactions entered
into by an agent. This is consistent with a broad theme in agency doc-
trine. Across the board, agency doctrine tends to cut off a principal’s
ability to look after-the-fact at the consequences of an agent’s interac-
tion with a third party and determine then whether to be bound by
what the agent has done. If Bernard buys a painting for Isabella, and
he had actual or apparent authority to do so, Isabella cannot later
avoid the purchase on the basis that Bernard made a poor choice.
Agency doctrine forecloses Isabella’s ability to argue that Bernard’s
power to bind her encompassed only those contracts that she, after
the fact, finds advantageous. Isabella may argue that she extended
authority to Bernard on such limited terms, but if she led third parties
with whom Bernard dealt to believe that he acted with unqualified
authority, Isabella will be bound on the basis of Bernard’s apparent
authority.
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In contrast, in the narrow run of cases in which an agent’s knowl-
edge is not imputed to the principal on the basis that the agent acted
adversely to the principal, the risk of explicit or implicit collusion be-
tween agent and principal is missing. Likewise missing is any oppor-
tunity for the principal to speculate at the third party’s expense. The
agent’s actions place the agent outside the control structures put in
place by the principal, just as an agent is outside them when the agent
deals with the principal as an adverse party.
Imputation may also be justified on the basis of its impact on be-
havior. It creates strong incentives for principals to select, train, and
monitor agents carefully, and to design effective systems for handling
and reporting information. Imputation also reduces a principal’s in-
centives to deploy agents as shields against the legal consequences of
information that a principal would prefer not to know. This is so be-
cause, from a principal’s standpoint, it is preferable that an agent
transmit “bad facts” so that the principal may determine how to react,
as opposed to proceeding with a transaction in the absence of actual
knowledge. Actually knowing the facts, a principal might decide to
exit from a transaction, might negotiate for a different price, or might
otherwise negotiate different terms. Imputation treats a principal as if
the principal knew what the agent knew; if in fact the agent did not
disclose material facts to the principal, the transaction might well be
on terms that an informed principal would not have chosen, taking
into account the legal consequences that follow from imputation.
The invariant quality of imputation may lead to results that seem
unfair to a principal who has taken all reasonable measures—or even
adopted measures beyond those most principals would adopt—in se-
lecting and monitoring its agents. But this quality makes imputation
doctrine simpler to apply than more nuanced fault-based alternatives
would prove in practice. Its invariant quality is also consistent with
basing imputation to some extent or in some fashion on an identifica-
tion between agent and principal. That is, if for some purposes the
agent is deemed to be the principal, it is hard to justify a lessening in
the consequences of that identity when it is present.
Although the illustrations in this Essay have focused on simple
relationships among agents and principals who are individual people,
the justifications advanced for imputation have equal if not height-
ened validity when a principal is an organization. Imputing its agents’
knowledge of material facts to an organization reduces the tempta-
tion for those who control the organization to structure it so that
knowledge of bad facts is isolated to agents who are not otherwise
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implicated in the organization’s dealings with a third party.59 Like the
Circumlocution Office in Little Dorrit,60 the result could be a reposi-
tory for an organization’s “bad facts” that would serve to deflect the
organization’s accountability to those with whom its other agents
deal.61
IX.  CONCLUSION
Agency has not enjoyed much fashion within the legal academy
in recent years. Many factors no doubt contribute to its unfashionable
status, including its decline as a freestanding subject for law school in-
struction.62 Agency is also not much of a focus for specialization
59. In many organizations, “an almost natural screening of bad news takes place” to insu-
late those at the top from the actual knowledge to which law and society more broadly assign
blame. MARK BOVENS, THE QUEST FOR RESPONSIBILITY: ACCOUNTABILITY AND
CITIZENSHIP IN COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS 79 (1998).
60. CHARLES DICKENS, LITTLE DORRIT (Penguin Books 1998) (1857). As described in
Chapter 10 (entitled “Containing the whole Science of Government”), the Circumlocution Of-
fice was the point of referral throughout the government when “[w]hatever was required to be
done, the Circumlocution Office was beforehand with all the public departments in the art of
perceiving—HOW NOT TO DO IT.” Id. at 110. The breadth of its influence was extensive:
Numbers of people were lost in the Circumlocution Office. Unfortunates with
wrongs, or with projects for the general welfare . . . who in slow lapse of time and ag-
ony had passed safely through other public departments . . . got referred to the Cir-
cumlocution Office, and never reappeared in the light of day.
Id. at 112. When challenged, the Circumlocution Office could count on loyal Parliamentary de-
fenders, with the result that “the Circumlocution Office was always voted immaculate, by an
accommodating majority.” Id.
61. On the imputed collective knowledge of an organization, see Gutter v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1309 (S.D. Fla. 2000):
Courts impose constructive knowledge upon a principal to avoid the injustice which
would result if the principal could have an agent conduct business for him and at the
same time shield himself from the consequences that would ensue from knowledge of
conditions or notice of the rights and interests of others had the principal transacted
his own business in person.
62. Some of this decline is perhaps attributable to generational changes. Many law school
curricula included a mandatory course in agency through the mid-to-late 1960s. However, as
those who taught the subject retired from classroom service, the subject either lost its manda-
tory status, or those in the next generation assigned to teach it did not protest when curricular
changes eliminated the agency course. For the history at Harvard Law School, see LOUIS LOSS,
ANECDOTES OF A SECURITIES LAWYER 18–20 (1995). When Professor Loss joined the Harvard
faculty in 1952, agency was a mandatory first-year course, taught in three or four sections by a
cohort of eight professors that included Warren A. Seavey, the Reporter for the first and second
Restatement of Agency. Id. at 18–19. Seavey retired from teaching the next year. Id. at 19. In the
1962–63 academic year, the faculty voted unanimously to abolish Agency as a separate course
on the stated assumption that the material would be covered in other courses, such as Corpora-
tions. Id. at 20. Professor Loss reports that
[n]one of us wanted to stand in the way of progress—although . . . I am not at all sure
that the various offerings that were invented to fill the Agency slot have in fact im-
proved the teaching program in general. The difference is that several of us who had
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within the legal profession; although its doctrinal tenets reach
broadly, agency is not likely to fill the plate of a lawyer’s work how-
ever much agency doctrines may matter on particular points. That
agency does not parallel specialization within the legal profession
may also help explain its low visibility within the academy.
Many doctrines within agency also have qualities that place them
out of sync with developments in other areas of the law and legal the-
ory. Basic agency doctrines are not fault-based; the legal conse-
quences of an agent’s actions are attributable to a principal even
when the principal was without fault in selecting or monitoring the
agent. Basic agency doctrines also operate on an all-or-nothing basis;
either the legal consequences of an agent’s actions are attributable to
the principal, or they are not. If an agent acts with actual or apparent
authority on behalf of a principal, the principal is bound by what the
agent did, even when the principal did not realize any benefit as a re-
sult. Thus, agency doctrines may strike some as unduly severe and
unmodulated by concern for the specifics of individual cases. Some
may be troubled by the conclusion that an agent may have acted “on
behalf of” a principal when, in fact, the principal did not benefit as a
consequence of the agent’s actions.
Imputation, as examined in this essay, is representative of agency
doctrines more generally. An agent’s knowledge of material facts is,
subject to a few exceptions, imputed to the principal even when, in
demonstrable fact, the principal was blameless. This is so even when
the principal is an organization including constituents who are
blameless and who were not in a position to control the agent. A
principal may not defeat imputation of an agent’s knowledge on the
basis that by withholding information, the agent breached a duty
owed to the principal or, in some other respect, did not benefit the
principal.
However unfashionable its intellectual style, imputation is crucial
to the legal accountability of organizations and of principals more
generally. Imputation reflects the insight that how an agent handles
information often reflects the agent’s understanding with the princi-
pal and the agent’s expectations about whether the principal wishes
the agent to be forthcoming or reticent when the agent knows infor-
mation material to the principal’s legal relations. Systematically, an
agent may err on the side of reticence when it would be detrimental
taught Agency under the private tutelage (at least in my case) of the great master
voted for abolition with a tear rather than a cheer.
Id.
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to the principal to learn what the agent knows. If a principal can
evade the legal consequences associated with knowledge, the princi-
pal can interact with third parties through agents in a manner that is
calibrated to distance itself from knowledge of facts that the principal
would prefer not to know. This increases the risk that a principal will
evade the consequences of its agents’ actions by assessing whether
they are advantageous or not for the principal, after-the-fact of action
taken by agents. Imputation guards against this risk.
